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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In reviewing the summary judgment entered in favor of 
Wadsworth, the Court of Appeals should evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the County. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the County, 
the board of county commissioners had a "reasonable basis" for 
rejecting Wadsworth's bid proposal as non-responsive to the 
County's invitation for bids because: (1) Wadsworth violated the 
instructions to bidders and the rules governing bids set forth in 
the County's invitation for bids, (2) the irregularities in 
Wadsworth's bid made it ambiguous as to the total bid price, and 
(3) the ambiguity in Wadsworth's bid gave Wadsworth an unfair 
competitive advantage over other bidders by allowing Wadsworth to 
claim either price as its intended bid. The board's determination 
did not involve fraud, collusion, misconduct, or abuse of 
discretion, and in the absence of such a finding, the district 
court erred by improperly substituting the court's own judgment for 
that of the board. 
The confusion caused by the irregularity in Wadsworth's bid 
proposal was not remedied by the letter sent to the County two days 
after the bid opening. The determination of responsiveness of a 
bid must be based solely on the bid documents themselves as they 
appear at the time of the bid opening. Subsequent communications 
as to what a bidder "intended", especially with regard to price, 
cannot be considered and are without effect after the bids have 
1 
been opened. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wadsworth's bid 
proposal was wrongfully rejected, Wcidsworth was still not entitled 
to summary judgment under the theories of breach of contract and 
negligence. There was no contract, express or implied, between the 
County and Wadsworth. Nor have the courts recognized any cause of 
action for "negligent consideration and rejection of bids" in the 
area of public construction contracts. The appropriate standard 
of judicial review for contested awards of public construction 
contracts is that the courts will not attempt to control the 
discretion of public officials, nor substitute the courts1 judgment 
for that of the public officials, except upon evidence of abuse of 
discretion, fraud, or corruption. This is true even if the 
officials1 decision appears erroneous or if reasonable persons may 
disagree. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wadsworth's bid 
proposal was wrongfully rejected, the judicial remedies available 
to Wadsworth as a wrongfully rejected bidder do not include an 
award for anticipated lost profits. Even if they did, Wadsworth 
failed to meet its burden of proof as to the amount of lost 
profits. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND ALL 
REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE COUNTY. 
In its brief, Wadsworth acknowledges that the standard for 
review of a motion for summary judgment is that "...the court must 
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly 
drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 
Inc., 739 P.2d 634, at 637 (Utah App. 1987). This Court has also 
held that the same standard applies when reviewing a summary 
judgment granted by a lower court. English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 
1154, at 1156 (Utah App. 1989); Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 
P.2d 941, at 946 (Utah App. 1989). 
Wadsworth argues, however, that the above standard does not 
apply in the present case. On page 1 of its brief, Wadsworth 
contends that because the County produced photocopies of the bid 
documents, rather than the originals, a "presumption favorable to 
Wadsworth arises" and the district court was therefore justified 
in failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
County on the issue of bid responsiveness. Wadsworth's argument 
is without merit for the following reasons: 
First, under Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
original of a writing is not required and other evidence of the 
contents of the writing is admissible if the originals are lost or 
have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them 
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in bad faith. In addition, under Rule 1003, a duplicate is 
admissible to the same extent as an original where, as in the 
present case, no genuine question is raised as to the authenticity 
of the original and it would not be unfair to admit the duplicate 
in lieu of the original. 
In the present case, Wadsworth waited over four (4) years 
after filing this lawsuit before filing a request for production 
of the original bid documents (R. 376). In all proceedings before 
the district court, Wadsworth accepted and relied upon the 
photocopies without any question as to their authenticity. The 
County, after making a diligent search of its own records (and 
after requesting thcit the outside consultant which verified and 
tabulated the bids also search its records for the originals), 
responded that, to the best of its knowledge, the original bid 
documents could not be located and were not in the County's 
possession. 
It is also important to note that two of Wadsworth's 
employees, Ralph Wadsworth and Guy Wadsworth, identified and 
authenticated photocopies of the original bid documents at their 
depositions, and that these authenticated copies of the bid 
documents are part of their sworn deposition testimony and part of 
the record in this case (R. 438 and 439, Deposition Exhibit 1). 
Second, a careful review of the four cases cited by Wadsworth 
in support of its argument (that the usual standard for review of 
a summary judgment is inapplicable in this case, and that a 
presumption arises favorable to Wadsworth due to the unavailability 
4 
of the original bid documents) reveals that these cases are 
inapposite. In three of these cases,1 when the original documents 
were lost or destroyed, there were no photocopies or duplicates of 
the lost or missing documents available which could be used in 
their place as evidence. As a result, in the absence of such 
photocopies or duplicates, there was a complete lack of evidence 
of the contents of the missing documents in question. In the 
fourth case,2 there were no lost or missing documents involved, but 
only the failure by one of the parties to call certain witnesses 
who possessed relevant knowledge of the facts. Thus, in each of 
these four cases, the courts found it necessary to create an 
evidentiary presumption due to the complete lack of any relevant 
evidence. 
By contrast, in the present case, the record contains 
photocopies of the bid documents which have been authenticated by 
Wadsworth's employees at their depositions and which are properly 
admissible as evidence under the above-cited rules of evidence. 
In addition, the record in this case contains affidavit testimony 
of witnesses who have examined the original bid documents in 
question (R. 289-330). Thus, in the present case, there is no lack 
of evidence as to the contents of the original documents, and, as 
1Public Health Trust v. Valcin. 507 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1987); 
Nation-Wide Check v. Forest Hills Distributors. 692 F.2d 214 
(1982); Carr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 384 F.Supp. 
821 (1974). 
2Whitney v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 374 P.2d 441 (Oregon 
1962). 
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a result, no necessity to create any evidentiary presumption. 
Accordingly, the Court should reject Wadsworth1s argument that 
the usual standard for review of a summary judgment does not apply 
in the present case, and the Court should view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the County. 
POINT II 
THE STATEMENT OF FACTS SET FORTH IN WADSWORTH1 S BRIEF 
IGNORES ALL OF THE FACTS FAVORABLE TO THE COUNTY, IS 
INACCURATE AS TO CERTAIN FACTS, AND IMPROPERLY VIEWS THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO WADSWORTH. 
In its brief, Wadsworth does not directly address or discuss 
the Statement of Facts set forth on pages 5 through 11 of the 
County's opening brief (Brief of Appellants). Instead, Wadsworth 
asserts certain statements under the heading "Undisputed Facts", 
many of which are inaccurate and are strongly disputed by the 
County. In addition, Wadsworth's statement of the facts ignores 
all of the facts favorable to the County. 
On page 7 of its brief, Wadsworth alleges it "...submitted to 
Salt Lake County its bid schedule, written in ink ctnd its total bid 
was also written in ink. . ." and that "All amounts in the bid 
schedule submitted by Wadsworth were entered in ink...." (Emphasis 
added). Contrary to Wadsworth's allegation, the evidence in the 
record shows that several boxes in Wadsworth!s bid schedule 
contained multiple entries written in both ink and pencil. 
Wadsworth entered two different unit prices on Schedule D for Item 
No. 1 Basin Floodwalls ($90 in ink and $140 in pencil, which were 
extended out to $179,100 in ink and $278,600 in pencil), and these 
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two prices were also listed in the subtotal for Schedule D 
($207,159.10 in ink and $306,659.10 in pencil) and in the Bidding 
Schedule Summary. Two different prices were also entered in the 
box for the Total Bid Price ($692,634.48 in ink and $792,134.48 in 
pencil). After the engineering consultant corrected for extension 
errors contained in Wadsworth's bid proposal, Wadsworth's two total 
bid prices were $692,640.48 for the ink figures and $792,140.48 for 
the pencil figures (R. 293, 297, 302, 438 and 439, Deposition 
Exhibit 1). 
On page 8 of its brief, Wadsworth refers to the pencil prices 
as "...other isolated and occasional light pencil notations in the 
margins of the Bid Schedule." A review of Deposition Exhibit 1 (R. 
4 38 and 439) shows that the pencil prices were not entered in the 
margins of the Bid Schedule, but instead were entered immediately 
above the ink figures within the price boxes. It should be noted 
that the illegible copy of the Bid Schedule attached to Wadsworth's 
brief as addendum 1 has never been authenticated and is a copy of 
an illegible copy which was attached to Wadsworth's complaint. 
The only properly identified and authenticated copies of the Bid 
Schedule are contained in the record at 438 and 439 as Deposition 
Exhibit 1. 
Wadsworth also alleges that the pencil figures "...did not add 
up." A review of the official bid tabulation (R. 294-302) prepared 
by the consulting engineer shows that neither the ink prices nor 
the pencil prices submitted by Wadsworth added up, as a result of 
extension errors contained in Wadsworth's bid; however, these 
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extension errors were corrected by the engineering consultant, and 
the contract was awarded based on the engineer's corrected totals 
(R. 293, 272). 
Wadsworth also alleges that "Wadsworth intended that only the 
figures written in ink be part of the bid..." (Emphasis added). 
This allegation is directly contradicted by the deposition 
testimony of Guy Wadsworth that "We wanted to put a contingency 
number in in case I had made a serious mistake," and "...we wanted 
to hedge our bets, I guess." (R. 439, p. 7). Moreover, as 
discussed under Point IV below, it is not the subjective intent of 
a bidder which is determinative, but rather the actual contents of 
the bid proposal. 
On page 9 of its brief, Wadsworth alleges that "At the County 
Commission meeting concerning Wadsworth's bid, Commissioner Barker 
stated that it was clear that Wadsworth intended the inked figure 
of $692,634.48 as its bid." Contrary to this allegation, the 
official Minute Book of the Board of County Commissioners states 
that "Commissioner Barker felt the bid was clearly ambiguous." (R. 
317, emphasis added). Commission Barker also stated in his 
affidavit that one of the reasons for rejecting Wadsworth's bid 
proposal was that it was "...ambiguous as to the total price." (R. 
314) . 
As shown above, the statement of facts set forth in 
Wadsworth's brief is inaccurate as to certain facts, ignores all 
facts favorable to the County, and improperly views the evidence 
in the light most favorable to Wadsworth. Accordingly, the County 
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respectfully submits that the Court should view the evidence in a 
light more favorable to the County as set forth in the Statement 
of Facts contained in the Countyfs opening brief (Brief of 
Appellants). 
POINT III 
THE COUNTY DOES NOT CLAIM THAT IT HAS DISCRETION TO AWARD 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS TO WHOMEVER IT WANTS. 
In its brief, Wadsworth misrepresents the Countyfs position 
and misstates the County's argument on the issue of the discretion 
of the board of county commissioners in awarding public 
construction contracts. On page 12 of its brief, Wadsworth states: 
Salt Lake County contends, however, that it has the 
discretion to award contracts to whomever it wants 
regardless the County's own ordinance and bid documents 
mandating the award to the low responsible bidder. 
Contrary to the statement in Wadsworth's brief, the County has 
never contended that it has discretion to award contracts to 
whomever it wants. Nor has the County ever contended that it has 
discretion to ignore its own ordinance or bid documents. 
Rather, it is the County's position that the board of county 
commissioners is vested by law with the discretion to determine: 
(1) whether or not a bid proposal is responsive to the County's 
invitation for bids, consistent with the County's ordinance and bid 
documents, and (2) whether or not to waive informalities in a bid 
proposal, consistent with the County's ordinance and bid documents. 
In the present case, under the Instructions to Bidders and the 
Rules Governing Bids contained in the County's Invitation to Bid, 
the County had discretion to evaluate the responsiveness of the 
9 
bids it received and to determine whether or not to waive any 
informalities in those bids: 
1:3:03 Changes in or additions to the bid form, 
recapitulations of the work bid upon, alternative 
proposals, or any other modification of the bid form 
which is not specifically called for in the contract 
documents may result in the Countyfs rejection of the bid 
as not being responsive to the invitation. (Emphasis 
added.) 
1:3:04 The Board of County Commissioners reserves the 
right to reject any and all proposals, and to waive any 
informality in the proposal r€>ceived. 
The discretion vested in public procurement officials includes 
the discretion to evaluate bids as well as the discretion to 
determine the compliance of a bid with the specifications and the 
instructions to prospective bidders: 
It is a general rule that bids for public contracts 
must substantially comply with the requirements of the 
specifications for bidding and the directions to 
prospective bidders. The determination as to whether 
these requirements are satisfied and the awarding of a 
contract are acts of discretion which will be enjoined 
only if done illegally, arbitrarily, capriciously, or 
unreasonably. (Emphasis added.) 
State v. Weisz & Sons. Inc., 713 P.2d 176, at 186 (Wyo. 1986). 
Moreover, the determination by a public agency of the 
responsiveness or non-responsiveness of a bid is within the 
agency's discretion, subject, on judicial review, to an 
ascertainment that there was a "reasonable basis" for the agency's 
action. State v. Bowers Office Products, Inc.. 621 P.2d 11, at 13 
(Alaska 1980); Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, at 917-18 (Alaska 
1971). 
Accordingly, contrary to the statement in Wadsworth's brief, 
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the County does not claim that it has discretion to award public 
contracts to whomever it wants. Nor does the County claim that it 
has discretion to ignore its own ordinance and bid documents. It 
is the County's claim that it properly exercised its discretion, 
consistent with its ordinance and bid documents, and that it had 
a "reasonable basis" for rejecting Wadsworth's bid proposal as non-
responsive. Thus, the Court should disregard Wadsworth's statement 
which misrepresents the County's position on this issue. 
POINT IV 
WADSWORTH WAS NOT THE LOWEST RESPONSIVE, RESPONSIBLE 
BIDDER ON THE PROJECT, BECAUSE ITS BID PROPOSAL WAS NON-
RESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTY'S INVITATION FOR BIDS. 
The County agrees with Wadsworth that, pursuant to county 
ordinance, when the County awards a public construction contract, 
the award must be made to the lowest responsive, responsible 
bidder. The County also agrees that Wadsworth is a responsible 
contractor, i.e., properly licensed and able to perform the work 
in an acceptable manner. The parties disagree, however, on the 
issue of whether or not Wadsworth's bid proposal was responsive to 
the County's invitation for bids. 
The evidentiary facts and legal arguments in support of the 
County's position that Wadsworth's bid proposal was non-responsive 
to the County's invitation for bids are fully stated in the 
County's opening brief (Brief of Appellants, pp. 5-11 and 18-22) 
and will not be repeated here. 
Wadsworth's position that the County wrongfully rejected 
Wadsworth's bid as non-responsive is based upon the argument that 
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the County should have ignored the pencil prices in Wadsworth's bid 
since the instructions to bidders state that: 
1.2.04 On the bidding schedule of the proposal form 
the unit prices shall be written in ink or typed both in 
words and numerals. In cases of discrepancy the amount 
in words shall be construed to be the desired amount. 
Wadsworth's argument that the County should have ignored the 
pencil prices is without merit for the following reasons: 
First, by entering two unit prices on Schedule D for Item No. 
1 Basin Floodwalls, one in pencil and one in ink, Wadsworth 
violated the above instruction to bidders which required all 
entries to be in ink or typed. For that reason alone, Wadsworth 
was not responsive. Wadsworth further violated this instruction 
by failing to write its unit prices in both words and numerals, 
which would have cleared up any discrepancy as to the desired 
(intended) amount. Here, again, Wadsworth was not responsive. 
Wadsworth's own failure to follow the above instructions to bidders 
resulted in confusion as to which number should be used and, as a 
result, rendered Wadsworth's bid ambiguous. The purpose for which 
these instructions are given is to eliminate confusion and 
ambiguity. Had Wadsworth followed the above instructions, by 
writing all of its prices in ink, and only in ink, and by writing 
its prices in both words and numerals, as required by the 
instructions, there would have been no discrepancy or ambiguity. 
Nor would there have been any resulting confusion as to which 
numbers should be used (see Wadsworth's letter dated July 31, 1985 
at R. 439, Deposition Exhibit 2). Instead, Wadsworth violated 
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these instructions and now seeks to profit from its own violation• 
Second, contrary to Wadsworth's contention, the multiple-price 
irregularity in Wadsworth's bid not only made its bid ambiguous as 
to the total price, but also gave Wadsworth an unfair competitive 
advantage by allowing Wadsworth to claim either of the two bid 
prices as its intended bid after the bids were opened. 
Because the County retains the discretion to waive the ink 
requirement and the requirement that all prices be in writing as 
well as in numbers, as "informalities", if it had been to 
Wadsworth's advantage to have the pencil prices considered as its 
bid, Wadsworth could have claimed it intended the higher pencil 
prices and insisted that the pencil informality be waived under 
rule 1.3.04, set forth above. 
However, because Wadsworth!s two total price figures straddled 
the total price figure submitted by Gerber, Wadsworth claimed after 
the bids were opened that the lower figure was its intended bid. 
By submitting two alternative prices, Wadsworth placed itself in 
a position where it could claim either of the two prices as its 
intended bid, depending upon which one turned out to be the most 
advantageous to Wadsworth after the bids were opened. 
Wadsworth also argues that any confusion caused by the 
irregularity in its bid proposal should have been cleared up by 
the letter sent to the County two days after the bid opening. The 
letter stated: "This letter is to clarify some confusion 
concerning our bid on referenced project." (R. 439, Deposition 
Exhibit 2) . In the letter, Wadsworth purports to "confirm" that 
13 
it intended the ink prices and not the pencil prices. 
The argument that Wadsworth's post-bid-opening letter should 
have cured any irregularity or dispelled any confusion as to 
Wadsworth's intent is without merit. Rule 1.3.03 of the Rules 
Governing Bids specifically prohibits any modification of bids 
after the bids have been opened. Moreover, Wadsworth's claim, made 
after the bid opening, that it "intended" to have only the ink 
prices in its bid considered by the County, and not the pencil 
prices, is wholly irrelevant. The courts have uniformly held that 
the determination of responsiveness must be based solely on the bid 
documents themselves as they appear at the time of opening. 
Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, at 648 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) . To give effect to a subsequent communication which affects 
the price of a bid after the bids have been opened would undermine 
the competitive bidding process which is intended to insure fair 
competition among all bidders. Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. v. United 
States, 597 F.2d 1371, at 1377 (Ct. CI. 1979). 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO THE BOARD'S DETERMINATION THAT 
WADSWORTH'S BID WAS NON-RESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTY'S 
INVITATION FOR BIDS. 
In its brief, Wadsworth fails to address the issue on appeal 
of whether the district court erred by failing to apply the correct 
standard of judicial review to the determination of the board of 
county commissioners as to the responsiveness of Wadsworth's bid. 
In cases where it has been alleged, as in the present case, 
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that there has been an improper award of a public construction 
contract by a public authority, it is well established that the 
appropriate standard of judicial review of the public authority's 
decision is whether or not the public authority has acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously or has otherwise abused its discretion. 
In its opening brief, the County cites authorities for the 
proposition that, while it is a court's duty to review the action 
of public officials in awarding a contract, the court should not 
interfere with the decision of the public officials, nor substitute 
the court's judgment for that of the public officials, unless there 
is evidence of abuse of discretionf fraud, collusion, or 
misconduct. And, the legal test applied by the courts to determine 
if there has been an abuse of discretion is whether or not the 
public officials had a "reasonable basis" for their decision. (See 
discussion and authorities cited in the County's opening brief 
(Brief of Appellants), pp. 14-18.) 
In view of Wadsworth's failure to discuss this issue or to 
address the legal authorities cited in the County's brief, it would 
appear that Wadsworth concedes this point. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND WADSWORTH. 
In its brief, Wadsworth argues that "fundamental principles 
of contract law" clearly establish the existence of an "express 
preliminary contract" between the County and Wadsworth. Wadsworth 
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cites two Utah cases3 in support of this argument. 
However, an examination of these cases reveals that both of 
them are inapposite. Neither of these cases involved the awarding 
of public contracts or bidding disputes. The Resource Management 
case involved a suit for specific performance on an oil and gas 
royalty rights contract. The Suaarhouse Finance case involved a 
suit for the nonpayment of a promissory note. 
More on point is the case of Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). In Rapp, the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
addressed the issue of whether a bid proposal submitted in response 
to an invitation to bid for a public construction contract creates 
any contractual relationship, either express or implied, between 
the bidder and the public authority which invites the bids. 
In Rapp, the Court concluded that an advertisement for bids 
is not itself an offer, rather the bid is the offer, which creates 
no right until accepted. The Court further stated that, 
particularly in the case of public contracts, the requirement of 
certain formalities by law, such as a written contract, indicates 
that even after acceptance of a bid, there is no contract until 
there has been compliance will the required formalities, such as 
a signed written contract. 527 P.2d, at 654. 
In the present case, the County's invitation for bids was not 
an offer. Rather, it was an invitation for offers, and Wadsworth's 
3Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 
1985); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 
1980). 
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bid proposal was the offer. Moreover, the fact that Wadsworth's 
offer contained a promise to hold its bid open for sixty days and 
provide a bid bond does not change Wadsworth's bid proposal from 
an offer into an acceptance. This is basic law in the area of 
public construction contracts. See 1 Williston on Contracts, (3rd 
Ed.) section 31. 
Accordingly, there was no contract, either express or implied, 
between the County and Wadsworth, and the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment in Wadsworth's favor under a breach of 
contract theory. 
POINT VII 
WADSWORTH IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER MONETARY DAMAGES IN 
THE NATURE OF LOST PROFITS UNDER THE THEORIES OF BREACH 
OF CONTRACT OR NEGLIGENCE. 
On page 22 of its brief, Wadsworth acknowledges that "many 
courts" have held that a wrongfully rejected bidder is not entitled 
to recover lost profits. However, Wadsworth argues that these 
cases are inapplicable to the present case. Wadsworth's argument 
is without merit. 
Although courts which have addressed this issue have held that 
a wrongfully rejected bidder on a public construction contract may 
prosecute an action against the awarding authority for injunction, 
mandamus, or declaratory judgment, the courts have uniformly held 
that there is no remedy against the awarding authority for damages 
in the nature of lost profits, under either a breach of contract 
or negligence theory. Annotation: Public Contracts: Low Bidder's 
Monetary Relief Against State or Local Agency for Nonaward of 
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Contract, 65 ALR4th 93; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd 
Ed.)# section 29.86; Stein, Construction Law, Vol. 1, section 
2.03[3][c] (Matthew Bender, 1990). 
This well-established rule of law is based upon sound public 
policy reasons which are more fully discussed in the above-cited 
Annotation and in the County's opening brief (Brief of Appellants, 
pp. 30-32) and which will not be repeated here. 
In its brief, Wadsworth cites the case of Southern California 
Acoustics Co., Inc. v. C.V. Holder, Inc.. 456 P.2d 975 (Cal. 1969), 
for the proposition that "a wrongfully rejected bidder under a 
municipal bidding statute is entitled to recover monetary damages, 
including lost profits." However, a careful review of this case 
indicates that no award of lost profits was made against the public 
authority awarding the construction contract. Instead, the Court 
in Southern California Acoustics only held that the plaintiff, a 
subcontractor, could recover lost profits from the general 
contractor which had improperly substituted another subcontractor 
for the plaintiff. The Court specifically held that the plaintiff 
could not recover lost profits from the public authority (a school 
district) which had awarded the construction contract. 
The County acknowledges thait courts in a few jurisdictions 
have begun to allow a wrongfully rejected bidde»r to recover bid 
preparation costs (but not lost profits) under certain 
circumstances.4 See Stein, Construction Law, Vol. 1, section 
See cases cited in County's opening brief (Brief of 
Appellants) on pp. 31-32. 
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2.03[3][c]; see also Annotation, 65 ALR4th 93. That remains, 
however, a position of very few courts. More important, and 
controlling in this situation, is the decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in the Rapp case, which adopted the majority position that 
an unsuccessful bidder may not recover bid preparation costs from 
the awarding public authority. As a result, in Utah, as in the 
majority of other jurisdictions, an unsuccessful bidder must seek 
a timely remedy for equitable relief in the nature of injunction, 
mandamus, or declaratory relief. 
On page 23 of its brief, Wadsworth states "...that Rapp should 
no longer be considered valid law in this state in view of the 
trend to award monetary damages to wrongfully rejected bidders." 
The County submits that Rapp is the law in this state, and further, 
that it is consistent with the great weight of authority in the 
majority of other jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, Wadsworth is not entitled to recover damages in 
the nature of lost profits, and the district court erred in 
awarding lost profits as the measure of damages in this case. 
POINT VIII 
EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, WADSWORTH WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
DAMAGES IN THE NATURE OF LOST PROFITS, WADSWORTH FAILED 
TO CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, THEREBY 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Wadsworth had the burden of proof as to the amount of lost 
profits, if any. For the reasons stated in the County's opening 
brief (Brief of Appellants, pp.33-35), Wadsworth failed to meet its 
burden of proof. 
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Wadsworthfs claimed amount of lost profits was speculative and 
uncertain due to the lack of foundation and documentation, and 
genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to this issue 
thus precluding summary judgment* 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the County respectfully requests 
that the Court vacate the summary judgment entered by the district 
court below and remand this case for further proceedings, 
DATED this day of December, 1990. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
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